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Abstract
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which re-
quires the cooperation of diﬀerent authorities, is a problematic issue, espe-
cially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-deﬁned.
Following Ni and Wang [12] we assume that a river is a segment divided
into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when
the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides
useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsi-
bility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream
Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing
costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule
via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility
of regions.
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1 Introduction
Motivation The presence of waste in river channels is a common environ-
mental problem. This is a major problem faced by authorities since waste can
pollute water, which can be harmful for people, plants and animals, causing se-
rious diseases and aﬀecting ecosystems. In fact, the OECD has argued that it is
necessary to assess the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of water pollution abatement
measures in the context of river basin management (OECD [13]). Around the
world, about 200 rivers (see Ambec and Sprumont [2] and Barret [3]) ﬂow across
national borders, and a much greater number across borders between regions
or municipalities. Cleaning transboundary rivers requires cooperation on the
part of the diﬀerent authorities involved and coordination of eﬀorts if it is to be
eﬀective. However, the distribution of the costs of cleaning such rivers among
the diﬀerent regions may be a problematic issue, particularly when the extent
to which each region is responsible for the waste discharged is not well-deﬁned.
As far as we know, the ﬁrst paper to analyze the problem of sharing the costs of
cleaning a river among diﬀerent regions from a theoretical point of view is that
of Ni and Wang [12]. They model a river as a segment which is divided into
subsegments from upstream to downstream such that each region is located
in one of them. They assume that there is a central agency that determines
the cost of cleaning each of these segments and they axiomatically propose two
rules for allocating the total cleaning costs among all regions along the river.
The ﬁrst rule, called Local Responsibility Sharing, establishes that the cost of
cleaning a segment of the river should be assigned to the region located in that
segment. The second rule, called Upstream Equal Sharing, states that the cost
of cleaning a segment must be distributed equally among the region in that
segment and all the regions situated upstream from it.1 We show that neither
of these rules allocates the costs in a way that reﬂects the responsibility of each
region in producing the waste present in river channels. The ﬁrst does not take
into consideration that the water of a river ﬂows from one segment to another,
taking part of the waste with it. The second implicitly assumes that the region in
a segment and all the regions situated upstream from this have the same degree
of responsibility for the waste present in the segment in question. However, this
1These rules are based on the theories of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and Unlimited
Territorial Integrity, respectively (see Godana [8] and Kilgour and Dinar [11]).
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would only be “fair” if all regions have discharged exactly the same quantity of
waste of the one present in that segment, which is not necessarily the case.
Overview of results In this paper, we seek to develop an alternative rule to
those proposed by Ni and Wang [12] which takes into account the responsibility
of the regions for the presence of the waste. We explicitly introduce into our
model the fact that the waste is transferred, with the water, from upstream
to downstream at a particular rate, an idea that is implicitly assumed in Ni
and Wang [12]. If the social planner knew this rate, she could use the cost
vector to accurately calculate the amount of waste discharged by each region
into the river, and the costs could thus be distributed according to their actual
responsibilities. However, in practice, the transfer rate may be unknown. In that
case, we show that the social planner could estimate certain limits of that rate
from the cost vector. Those limits provide useful information for distributing
the costs fairly, since they enable certain limits of responsibility to be inferred
for each region. The rules proposed by Ni and Wang [12] do not always assign
costs in the intervals constructed with these limits, thus violating this basic
principle of fairness.
We introduce a set of desirable properties taking into account this information
concerning the responsibility of each region in discharging the waste. Those
properties are: (푖) Limits of Responsibility, which requires the cost paid by each
region for cleaning its own segment always to be within its limits of responsi-
bility; (푖푖) No Downstream Responsibility, which states that a region 푗 situated
downstream from another region 푖 has no responsibility for the waste present in
푖 and therefore does not have to pay anything towards the cost of cleaning it up;
(푖푖푖) Consistent Responsibility, which ensures that the part of the cost of clean-
ing a segment paid by one region relative to the part paid by another region is
consistent throughout all the segments situated downstream from both regions;
and (푖푣) Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer Rate, which
states that when information on the transfer rate improves in such a way that it
becomes natural to induce a higher (lower) estimated value for the real transfer
rate, the amount of waste in any segment for which all its upstream regions are
responsible must not be lower (higher) than before.
That set of properties characterize a new cost allocation rule, the Upstream
Responsibility rule, which works as follows: ﬁrst, it assigns to the region situ-
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ated in a given segment the mid-point in the interval between its lower and its
higher limits of responsibility. The remaining cost of cleaning the segment in
question is divided among the upstream regions, maintaining the proportions of
the allocation of the cost of cleaning the previous segment.
Related literature The study of allocation problems using game theoretical
and/or axiomatic models to solve issues related to transboundary rivers has
developed in two directions. On the one hand (the harmful side) some authors
have developed models for studying how to share the costs of cleaning a river
among the regions located along it. On the other hand (the beneﬁcial side)
some papers have analyzed models for determining how to share water resources
among the diﬀerent regions along a river.
Among the papers dealing with the harmful side, which is the body of liter-
ature into which our paper ﬁts, there are two main approaches. Several papers,
starting with Ni and Wang [12] and including ours, consider a river as a seg-
ment divided into diﬀerent regions and assume that the cost of cleaning each
region is exogenously given. Along these lines, Ni and Wang [12] propose and
characterize the two rules - Local Responsibility Sharing and Upstream Equal
Sharing - described above. They also defend these rules as the Shapley values
of two appropriately deﬁned TU games and as solutions belonging to the core of
this problem. Van den Brink and van der Laan [17] show that these additional
results are particularizations of certain well-known results of cooperative game
theory and they provide an alternative axiomatic characterization of these rules.
This model is extended by Dong et al. [6] by considering a river as a network.
Based on a diﬀerent principle (the “polluter-pays” principle), Go´mez-Ru´a [9]
deﬁnes water taxes according to regions’ responsibilities for pollution and char-
acterizes several cost allocation rules based on properties of those taxes. Other
papers such as Gengenbach et al. [7] and van der Laan and Moes [16] take a sub-
stantially diﬀerent approach by assuming that the cost allocation rule adopted
may aﬀect the decision of each region about how much waste to discharge.
On the beneﬁcial side, papers generally analyze water allocation problems
and the fair distribution of the welfare resulting from distributing the water of
a river among diﬀerent regions. Based on cooperative game theory, Ambec and
Sprumont [2] model this situation by deﬁning a coalitional form game. They
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analyze how water should be allocated across the agents and propose what
monetary transfers should be made. Along these lines, Ambec and Ehlers [1]
generalize the aforesaid model by allowing for satiable agents. Wang [19], using
a similar model but with a market-based approach, analyzes eﬃcient allocations
when trade is restricted to neighboring agents along the river. Khmelnitskaya
[10], and van der Brink et al. [18] extend the previous models by considering
rivers with multiple springs.2 Rebille and Richefort [15] analyze the problem of
water allocation from a non-cooperative point of view.
Remainder The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the model and introduces a result that shows that the cost vector can provide
useful information worth considering when constructing a cost allocation rule
based on responsibility. Section 3 discusses some axioms for cost allocation
rules reﬂecting basic ideas of responsibility. Section 4 deﬁnes the Upstream
Responsibility rule and provides a characterization of it based on the axioms
deﬁned previously. Section 5 concludes, with a discussion of how the basic
model presented in the previous sections can be extended to cover more complex
situations. The Appendix contains the proofs of the characterization result and
the independence of the axioms.
2 The model
Consider a river which is divided into 푛 segments of the same size from upstream
to downstream. There is a set of regions, each of which is located in one of the
segments, which have discharged waste into the river. This river has a transfer
rate 푡 that measures the proportion of waste that is transferred from one segment
of the river to the next. This transfer rate may not be exactly known. Consider
a general case in which the social planner knows that 푡 is situated within an
interval [푡, 푡] ⊆ [0, 1].3
There is a central agency that determines the cost of cleaning the river in each
2For more details on the use of cooperative game theory to model water allocation problems,
readers are referred to any of the numerous surveys on the matter. See for instance, Be´al et
al. [5], Beard [4] and Parrachino et al. [14]
3The case in which 푡 = 푡 is the situation in which the social planner knows the actual
transfer rate, while the case in which 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1 is the case in which there is no
information about 푡.
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segment. We assume that this cost is exactly the amount of waste present in
the segment in question.4 The agency has to allocate the costs of the cleaning
process to the diﬀerent regions in a fair way. Our main objective is to ﬁnd rules
for allocating those costs in a way that reﬂects the responsibility of each region
in the discharging of the waste.
Formally, let 푁 = {1, ..., 푛} ⊂ ℕ be a ﬁnite set of regions such that 푖 is situated
upstream of 푖 + 1 for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛 − 1}. Let 퐶 = (푐1, ..., 푐푛) ∈ ℝ푛+ be the
cleaning cost vector, where 푐푖 represents the cost incurred to clean the river in
region 푖. Then, a cost allocation problem is a tuple (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡).5
A cost allocation rule is a mapping 푥 that assigns to each problem (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) a
vector 푥(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = (푥1(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡), . . . , 푥푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)) ∈ ℝ푛+ such that∑
푖∈푁
푥푖(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
∑
푖∈푁
푐푖, where 푥푖(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) represents the cost allocated to
region 푖 by the rule in this problem.6
The solution that the rule 푥 assigns to a problem (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) can be deﬁned also
as a matrix of size 푛×푛, (푥푗푖 )푖,푗∈{1,...,푛}(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) such that
∑
푖∈푁
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푗 and
∑
푗∈푁
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푥푖(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). With this interpretation, 푥
푗
푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)
represents the part of the cost of cleaning the river in segment 푗 that region 푖
pays. When there is no risk of confusion about the description of the problem,
we will only write 푥푗푖 (⋅).
Although the transfer rate 푡 cannot be totally known by the social planner, there
is some information that can be deduced from the cleaning cost vector because
some values of 푡 may be incompatible with 퐶.
4This assumption is made for the sake of ﬂuency. We could have assumed instead that the
cost of cleaning each segment is an increasing linear function of the amount of waste present
in it, without essentially altering the results.
5The problem can be deﬁned directly by a triple (퐶, 푡, 푡) given that the information on 푁
is included in 퐶. However, we prefer to maintain both to be consistent with the notation used
by Ni and Wang [12].
6The condition
∑
푖∈푁
푥푖(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
∑
푖∈푁
푐푖 is imposed in the studies of Ni and Wang [12]
and van der Brink and van der Laan [17] as an axiom called Eﬃciency. We consider that this
property should be included in the deﬁnition of a rule.
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Proposition 1 Let (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) be a problem. Then, the transfer rate 푡 satisﬁes
that 푡 ≤ 푡∗(푡, 퐶), where
푡
∗
(푡, 퐶) = min
{
min
푖∈{2,...푛−1}
{
푐푖
푐푖−1
}
,
푐푛
푐푛−1 + 푐푛
, 푡
}
.
Additionally, any value of 푡 between 푡 and 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶) is compatible with 퐶.
Proof. Let (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) be a problem. For any segment 푖 ∈ 푁 ∖ {푛}, the cost
that we observe, 푐푖, is the diﬀerence between all the waste entering the segment,
denoted as 푉 ∗푖 , and the amount transferred to the next segments, given by 푡푉
∗
푖 .
Then, 푐푖 = 푉
∗
푖 − 푡푉 ∗푖 for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛− 1}.
Given that the waste cannot be transferred far from the most downstream re-
gion7, we have that 푐푛 = 푉
∗
푛 . Then,
푉 ∗푖 =
{
푐푖
1−푡 if 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛− 1}
푐푖 if 푖 = 푛.
(1)
Let 푉푖 be the amount of waste thrown into the water by region 푖. It is imme-
diate that 푉푖 ≤ 푉 ∗푖 given that upstream regions may transfer waste to region
푖. In particular, the amount thrown into the water by region 푖 is the diﬀerence
between the total amount entered segment 푖 and the amount transferred from
its immediate upstream segment. Then, for all 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛}, 푉푖 = 푉 ∗푖 − 푡푉 ∗푖−1.
However, for 푖 = 1, since there is no upstream region, 푉1 = 푉
∗
1 . Then,
푉푖 =
{
푉 ∗푖 if 푖 = 1
푉 ∗푖 − 푡푉 ∗푖−1 if 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛}.
(2)
Using expressions (1) and (2), we can obtain an expression of 푉푖 in terms of 퐶
and 푡:
7Note that the fact that the region furthest downstream accumulates all the waste that
enters it, contrary to what occurs in the other regions, where part of the waste ﬂows on
to the next region downstream, introduces a particularity into the treatment of this region.
This is compatible with the concept of the river ending in a lake which belongs to a single
country. If, however, the river ends in the sea, the model can be easily adapted by dropping
this diﬀerentiation between regions.
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푉푖 =
⎧⎨⎩
푐푖
1−푡 if 푖 = 1
푐푖
1−푡 − 푐푖−11−푡 푡 if 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛− 1}
푐푖 − 푐푖−11−푡 푡 if 푖 = 푛.
(3)
Given that 푉푖 is, by deﬁnition, non-negative and taking into account expression
(3), we have that: (i) 푐푖1−푡 − 푐푖−11−푡 푡 ≥ 0, that is, 푡 ≤ 푐푖푐푖−1 for all 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛− 1},
and (ii) 푐푛− 푐푛−11−푡 푡 ≥ 0, so that, 푡 ≤ 푐푛푐푛+푐푛−1 . Additionally, it is easy to see from
the previous reasoning that any value for 푡 between 푡 and 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶) is compatible
with 퐶. Then we have arrived at the desired result.
Then, Proposition 1 allows us to reduce the uncertainty over the transfer rate.
In particular, the cost vector 퐶 provides, jointly with 푡, a maximum limit for
this rate that we denote 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶). To see the capacity of this result, consider the
following example.
Example 1 Suppose a problem in which 푁 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the cost vector is
퐶 = {10, 16, 8, 24} and the social planner has no information a priori about the
transfer rate, i.e., 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1. Then, focusing on the costs of cleaning the
segments, the information of the transfer of the waste can be improved using the
result of Proposition 1. In this case, we obtain that 푡∗(푡, 퐶) = min{ 85 , 12 , 34 , 1}.
Therefore, Proposition 1 indicates that the transfer rate is at most one half and,
then, the information of the transfer rate after observing the cost vector can be
adapted.
Given a problem (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡), we will denote by 푙푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) the amount of waste
present in segment 푗 that has been discharged by region 푖. When there is
no risk of confusion about the description of the problem, we simply write
푙푗푖 (⋅). The real transfer rate 푡 may be unknown, in which case 푙푗푖 (⋅) cannot be
precisely calculated. However, some limits of this value can be deduced from the
information about the transfer rate held by the social planner and from what
the planner can infer from the cost vector via Proposition 1. We will denote
the lower and higher limits of 푙푗푖 (⋅) by 푙푗푖 (⋅) and 푙
푗
푖 (⋅), respectively. The following
proposition will provide formulas for 푙푖푖(⋅) and 푙
푖
푖(⋅) for all 푖 ∈ 푁 .8
8It is also possible, but extremely tedious, to construct formulas for the limits of any 푙푗푖 (⋅)
in a similar way, but these ones are suﬃcient for our purposes.
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Proposition 2 Let (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) be a problem. Then,
푙푖푖(⋅) =
⎧⎨⎩
푐푖 if 푖 = 1
푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡∗(푡, 퐶) if 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛− 1}
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
1−푡∗(푡,퐶) if 푖 = 푛.
푙
푖
푖(⋅) =
⎧⎨⎩
푐푖 if 푖 = 1
푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡 if 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛− 1}
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푡1−푡 if 푖 = 푛.
Proof. Let (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) be a problem. First, take 푖 = 1. Given that this region
is the most upstream region in the river, it is straightforward that all the waste
in this segment is of its own responsibility. Then, 푙11(⋅) = 푙
1
1(⋅) = 푐1. Take now
any 푖 ∈ {2, . . . , 푛− 1}. In this case, we have that 푐푖−11−푡 units of waste entered in
region 푖− 1. Then, 푐푖−1⋅푡1−푡 units of waste entered in region 푖 from the immediate
upstream region, 푖− 1, and 푐푖−1⋅푡21−푡 of these units left region 푖 to the immediate
downstream region 푖+ 1. Therefore, 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡 units of the waste present in region
푖 are responsibility of the regions situated upstream from 푖. Then, given that
푡 ∈ [푡, 푡∗(푡, 퐶)], we have that 푙푖푖(⋅) = 푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡∗(푡, 퐶) and 푙
푖
푖(⋅) = 푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡.
Similarly, if 푖 = 푛, we have that 푐푛−11−푡 units of waste entered in region 푛 − 1.
Then, 푐푛−1⋅푡1−푡 units of waste entered and remain in region 푛 from its upstream
territories and, then, 푙푛푛(⋅) = 푐푛− 푐푛−1⋅푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
1−푡∗(푡,퐶) and 푙
푛
푛(⋅) = 푐푛− 푐푛−1⋅푡1−푡 , given that
푛 is the most downstream region. Then, the result is proved.
It is natural to require that any rule that seeks to allocate costs in terms of
each region’s responsibility for producing the waste present in each segment
should always respect the limits calculated in Proposition 2 when the costs are
allocated. In the rest of this section, we discuss the two rules proposed by Ni and
Wang [12] in relation to the fulﬁlment of this requirement. First, we introduce
the formal deﬁnitions of those rules.9
9Although their formal deﬁnitions in Ni and Wang [12] only describe the total cost that
each region pays for cleaning the whole river, we prefer to formulate them in terms of the
exact distributions across the diﬀerent segments.
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Deﬁnition 1 The Local Responsibility Sharing rule, 훼, is given by
훼푗푖 (⋅) =
{
0 if 푖 ∕= 푗
푐푖 if 푖 = 푗.
Deﬁnition 2 The Upstream Equal Sharing rule, 훽, is given by
훽푗푖 (⋅) =
{
0 if 푖 > 푗
푐푗
푗 if 푖 ≤ 푗.
On the one hand, the Local Responsibility Sharing rule meets the aforesaid
requirement of responsibility only when 푡 = 0. However, it can only be accepted
as a rule that allocates costs taking responsibilities into account if the real
transfer rate, 푡, is 0 in all rivers. Nevertheless, this literature only makes sense
when waste is transferred from one region to another, an idea that is totally
realistic. On the other hand, the following example shows that, independently
of the information about 푡 (푡 and 푡), the Upstream Equal Sharing rule does not
satisfy the requirement of allocating costs within the intervals of responsibility
deﬁned in Proposition 2.
Example 2 Consider the family of cost allocation problems (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) such that
푁 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and 퐶 = {10, 16, 8, 24}. In all these problems, the Upstream
Equal Sharing rule assigns to region 2 only half of the cost of cleaning its own
segment; i.e., 훽22(⋅) = 8. However, given that 푡∗(푡, 퐶) ≤ 12 , it is easy to calculate
from Proposition 2 that 푙22(⋅) ≥ 11 for all possible values of 푡 and 푡. Hence,
region 2 should pay at least 11 if responsibilities are considered.
3 Axioms
The axioms that we present for a rule are based on basic ideas about respon-
sibility for the waste present in the river channel. The ﬁrst axiom, Limits of
Responsibility, seeks to avoid the problem found in the rules of Ni and Wang
[12] studied in the previous section. To that end, the property requires that the
cost paid by each region for cleaning its own segment should always be within
the limits calculated in Proposition 2.
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Limits of Responsibility (LR): For all problems (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡), and for all
푖 ∈ 푁 , 푥푖푖(⋅) ∈ [푙푖푖(⋅), 푙
푖
푖(⋅)].
The second axiom, No Downstream Responsibility, states that a region 푗
located downstream from another region 푖 has no responsibility for the waste
present in 푖, and should therefore not pay any part of the cost of cleaning it up.
No Downstream Responsibility (NDR): For all problems (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and
all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 such that 푖 < 푗, 푥푖푗(⋅) = 0.
To introduce the next property, Consistent Responsibility, assume three regions
푖, 푗 and 푘 such that 푖 is located upstream from 푗 and 푗 upstream from 푘. A rule
decides how the cost of cleaning the river in region 푗 should be divided among
all the regions depending on their responsibility for the waste present in this
region. In particular, it establishes the responsibility of region 푖 relative to the
responsibility of region 푗 for producing that waste
(
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶,푡,푡)
푥푗푗(푁,퐶,푡,푡)
)
. Thus, given
that regions 푖 and 푗 do not produce any waste other than that which arrives at
some time at 푗, the axiom states that the rule must establish the same degree of
responsibility of region 푖 relative to the responsibility of region 푗 for the waste
present in region 푘
(
푥푘푖 (푁,퐶,푡,푡)
푥푘푗 (푁,퐶,푡,푡)
)
.10
Consistent Responsibility (CR): For all problems (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and all 푖, 푗, 푘 ∈
푁 such that 푖 < 푗 < 푘,
푥푗푗(⋅) ⋅ 푥푘푖 (⋅) = 푥푘푗 (⋅) ⋅ 푥푗푖 (⋅).
The last property, Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer
Rate, refers to situations in which, ceteris paribus, the information on the trans-
fer rate improves. Given a problem (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡), it is known from Proposition 1
that the transfer rate 푡 is within the interval [푡, 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶)]. Assume that informa-
tion on the transfer rate becomes more precise in such a way that some previ-
ous possible values of 푡 can now be ruled out; that is, consider a new problem
(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) such that [푢, 푢∗(푢,퐶)] ⊂ [푡, 푡∗(푡, 퐶)]. If this informational improve-
ment is such that the values discarded are mainly from the lower (higher) part of
10The axiom is not expressed in terms of these quotients but in terms of products so as to
avoid indeterminate forms.
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the interval [푡, 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶)], it would be natural to induce a not lower (not higher)
estimated value for the real transfer rate. Given that the cost vector is the
same, the quantity of waste in any segment for which responsibility lies with all
the upstream regions must be no lower (no higher) under the new estimation.
Therefore, the axiom requires that for any segment the total amount paid by
all its upstream regions for cleaning the segment in question should now be no
lower (no higher).
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate
(MIT): For all problems (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and (푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) such that [푢, 푢∗(푢,퐶)] ⊂
[푡, 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶)] and for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 such that 푖 < 푗,
푢− 푡 > 푡∗(푡, 퐶)− 푢∗(푢,퐶)⇒
∑
푖<푗
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≥
∑
푖<푗
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)
푢− 푡 < 푡∗(푡, 퐶)− 푢∗(푢,퐶)⇒
∑
푖<푗
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≤
∑
푖<푗
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡).
Observe that the above list of axioms includes, on the one hand, a basic
principle of fairness in this context (LR) and, on the other hand, a set of three
very weak properties (NDR, CR and MIT) that are satisﬁed by many possible
rules which are very diﬀerent one from another (for example, both 훼 and 훽
satisfy them). However, as shown below, the addition of LR to these three
axioms isolates one particular rule.
4 The Upstream Responsibility rule and a char-
acterization
This section presents a new cost allocation rule based on the responsibility of
the agents involved in discharging waste into a river. We then characterize it
using the four axioms from Section 3.
We begin by presenting our new rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, in
an intuitive way. To assign the total cost of cleaning each segment 푖, this
rule ﬁrst imputes to the region situated in that segment the mid-point in the
interval between the lower and upper limits of its responsibility, obtained from
Proposition 2. The remaining cost, if any, is allocated to the upstream regions
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in line with the proportions applied in the allocation of the cost of the previous
segment. The formal deﬁnition of the rule is a little more complex.
Deﬁnition 3 The Upstream Responsibility rule, 훾, is given by:
훾푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푖 > 푗,
푐푖 ⋅ 푠푗−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푗+1−푖 if 푖 ≤ 푗 < 푛,
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푠1−푠 if 푖 = 푗 = 푛,
푐푖⋅푠푗−푖−푐푖−1⋅푠푗+1−푖
1−푠 if 푖 < 푗 = 푛,
where 푠 = 푡+푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
2 and 푐0 is set to 0.
In order to illustrate the solution proposed by our rule in comparison with
those proposed in Ni and Wang [12], it is applied below to a particular cost
allocation problem.
Example 3 Consider again the cost allocation problem deﬁned in Example 1.
The solutions proposed to this problem by each of the rules in Ni and Wang [12]
are given by the following matrices:
훼(⋅) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
10 0 0 0
0 16 0 0
0 0 8 0
0 0 0 24
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
훽(⋅) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
10 8 83 6
0 8 83 6
0 0 83 6
0 0 0 6
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
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In contrast, the Upstream Responsibility rule assigns to this problem the
following solution:
훾(⋅) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
10 52
5
8
5
24
0 272
27
8
9
8
0 0 4 43
0 0 0 643
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The following result states that the Upstream Responsibility rule is character-
ized by the combination of the four axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule satisﬁes LR, NDR, CR and MIT if and only if it is the
Upstream Responsibility rule 훾.
We also show that this characterization is tight.
Proposition 3 Axioms LR, NDR, CR and MIT are independent.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that given a transboundary river with waste
transfer, the costs of cleaning the various regions provides information about
the responsibility of each of them in producing the waste. This information can
be useful for a social planner who has to allocate those costs to the diﬀerent
regions fairly. According to the information on responsibilities inferred from the
cost vector, we have proposed a new property, LR, which can be combined with
three more basic properties (NDR, CR and MIT) to characterize a unique cost
allocation rule: the Upstream Responsibility rule.
In order to infer this information about the responsibility of the various
regions, we have followed a simpliﬁed model that enables us to obtain the results
in a simpler manner. Although the model, as described, may seem too simple
to be applied to real cost allocation problems, it is not diﬃcult to extend it to
more general situations. Some of those extensions are discussed below.
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One of the basic assumptions of our model is that a river is a segment divided
into subsegments of the same size. We could posit a river with subsegments
of diﬀerent sizes to reﬂect that in reality regions occupy diﬀerent extensions
along a river. This case can easily be analyzed from our framework by dividing
all regions into smaller subsegments of the same size (by using the maximum
common divisor) and dividing the cost of cleaning each region proportionally
among all those subsegments. Another natural extension of our model is to
consider a river which is not a segment but a network divided into segments.
This could be useful in modeling a river with tributaries and/or forks. In that
case, all the results of the paper can be easily adapted by incorporating the
number of outlets on each fork into the calculation of the limits of the transfer
rate and extending the rule as Dong et al. [6] extend the rules of Ni and Wang
[12].
Another implicit assumption of our model is that the uncertainty of the
social planner on the transfer rate takes the form of a random variable with
uniform distribution, so the mean value between 푡 and 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶) is always a good
estimator of 푡. However, diﬀerent distributions may be assumed a priori and,
for those cases, a reformulation of axiom MIT would be necessary. To be more
precise, we would have to consider a modiﬁed version of MIT in which the
changes in the intervals are evaluated on the basis not of their lengths but of
their masses of probability of the speciﬁc random variable assumed. As a result,
the rule characterized would change to one in which the transfer rate considered
in allocating costs would be the expected value of the random variable after
truncating it at 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶).
Finally, another basic assumption of our model is that the transfer rate is
constant along the river. A natural extension of the model in this regard would
be to consider that the transfer rate changes in some areas of the river. This
could be useful in modeling rivers that run through changing terrain. In that
case, the model could be adapted by dividing the problem into subproblems
with homogeneous terrain. By applying Proposition 1 to each of them, diﬀerent
limits can be deduced for each particular transfer rate.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
First, it is easy to see that the Upstream Responsibility rule 훾 satisﬁes LR, NDR,
CR and MIT. To prove the other implication, consider a problem (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and
its corresponding 푡
∗
(푡, 퐶) inferred from Proposition 1. Let 푥 be a rule satisfying
LR, NDR, CR and MIT. We are going to show that 푥 has to correspond to 훾.
We will calculate the assignment given by 푥 in 푛 steps. In the 푗−th step,
we calculate the values of 푥푗푖 (⋅) for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}.
∙ Step 1: We distribute the cost 푐1. In this case, by NDR, 푥1푖 (⋅) = 0 for all
푖 > 1. Then, by deﬁnition of a rule, 푥11(⋅) = 푐1. If 푛 = 1, the proof is
ﬁnished. If 푛 > 1, go to step 2.
∙ Step 2: We distribute the cost 푐2. By NDR, 푥2푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 0 for all 푖 > 2.
Consider other problem (푁,퐶, 푠, 푠), where 푠 = 푡+푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
2 . Now, we have
two cases:
– If 푛 = 2, we have by LR that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푐2 − 푐1⋅푠1−푠 . We are
going to prove that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푥
2
2(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). If 푡 = 푠 = 푡
∗
, it is
straightforward that they are equal. For the rest of the cases, con-
sider all problems (푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) such that 푟 ∈ [푡, 푠). Then, by LR we
have that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) = 푐2 − 푐1⋅푟1−푟 . Given that 푟 − 푡 < 푡
∗ − 푟, we
have by MIT that 푥21(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≤ 푥21(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and then, by deﬁni-
tion, 푥22(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≥ 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). Therefore, 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≤ 푐2 −
푐1⋅(푠−휀)
1−(푠−휀) for all 휀 ≥ 0. Similarly, we can deduce that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≤
푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) for all 푢 ∈ (푠, 푡∗] and, then, 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≥ 푐2− 푐1⋅(푠+휀)1−(푠+휀)
for all 휀 ≥ 0. Then, the unique possibility is that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠). Therefore, 푥
2
2(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐2 − 푐1⋅푠1−푠 and, then, by def-
inition, 푥21(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐1⋅푠
1−푠 .
– If 푛 > 2, we have by LR that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푐2 − 푐1 ⋅ 푠. We are
going to prove that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푥
2
2(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). If 푡 = 푠 = 푡
∗
, it is
straightforward that they are equal. For the rest of the cases, consider
all problems (푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) such that 푟 ∈ [푡, 푠). Then, by LR we have
that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) = 푐2 − 푐1 ⋅ 푟. Given that 푟 − 푡 < 푡∗ − 푟, we have
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by MIT that 푥21(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≤ 푥21(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and then, by deﬁnition,
푥22(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≥ 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). Therefore, 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≤ 푐2 − 푐1 ⋅
(푠 − 휀) for all 휀 ≥ 0. Similarly, we can deduce that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≤
푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) for all 푢 ∈ (푠, 푡∗] and, then, 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≥ 푐2−푐1 ⋅(푠+휀)
for all 휀 ≥ 0. Then, the unique possibility is that 푥22(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푥22(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠). Therefore, 푥
2
2(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐2 − 푐1 ⋅ 푠 and, then, by
deﬁnition, 푥21(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐1 ⋅ 푠. Now, go to step 3.
∙ Step 푗, with 푗 ∈ {3, . . . , 푛}: We distribute the cost 푐푗 . By the appli-
cation of NDR, 푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 0 for all 푖 > 푗. Consider other problem
(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠), where 푠 = 푡+푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
2 . Now, we have two cases:
– If 푛 = 푗, we have by LR that 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푐푛 − 푐푛−1⋅푠1−푠 . We are
going to prove that 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푥
푛
푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). If 푡 = 푠 = 푡
∗
, it
is straightforward that they are equal. For the rest of the cases,
consider all problems (푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) such that 푟 ∈ [푡, 푠). Then, by
LR we have that 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) = 푐푛 − 푐푛−1⋅푟1−푟 . Given that 푟 − 푡 <
푡
∗ − 푟, we have by MIT that ∑
푖<푛
푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≤
∑
푖<푛
푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)
and then, by deﬁnition, 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푟, 푟) ≥ 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡). Therefore,
푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≤ 푐푛 − 푐푛−1⋅(푠−휀)1−(푠−휀) for all 휀 ≥ 0. Similarly, we can
deduce that 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≤ 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) for all 푢 ∈ (푠, 푡∗] and,
then, 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ≥ 푐푛 − 푐푛−1⋅(푠+휀)1−(푠+휀) for all 휀 ≥ 0. Then, the
unique possibility is that 푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푥
푛
푛(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠). Therefore,
푥푛푛(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푛 − 푐푛−1⋅푠1−푠 and, by deﬁnition,
푛−1∑
푖=1
푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푛−1⋅푠
1−푠 . By CR, 푥
푛
푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅푥푛−1푘 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푥푛푘 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅푥푛−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)
for all 푖, 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛−1}Or, equivalently, 푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅
푛−1∑
푖=1
푥푛−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푥푛−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ⋅
푛−1∑
푖=1
푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛− 1}.
Given that
푛−1∑
푖=1
푥푛−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푛−1 and that we also know from
step 푗 − 1 that 푥푛−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푖 ⋅ 푠푛−1−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푛−푖, we have
that for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛− 1},
푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푖 ⋅ 푠푛−푖−1 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푛−푖
푐푛−1
⋅ 푐푛−1 ⋅ 푠
1− 푠 .
Therefore, for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛− 1},
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푥푛푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푖 ⋅ 푠푛−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푛−푖+1
1− 푠 .
– If 푛 > 푗, we have by LR that 푥푗푗(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푐푗 − 푐푗−1 ⋅ 푠. As before,
we can prove by MIT that 푥푗푗(푁,퐶, 푠, 푠) = 푥
푗
푗(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and, then,
푥푗푗(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푗 − 푐푗−1 ⋅ 푠. Then, we have that
푗−1∑
푖=1
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푗−1⋅푠. By CR, 푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅푥푗−1푘 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푥푗푘(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅푥푗−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)
for all 푖, 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푗−1}. Or, equivalently, 푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡)⋅
푗−1∑
푖=1
푥푗−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푥푗−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) ⋅
푗−1∑
푖=1
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푗 − 1}.
Given that
푗−1∑
푖=1
푥푗−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푗−1 and that we also know from
step 푗−1 that 푥푗−1푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푖 ⋅ 푠푗−1−푖− 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푗−푖, we have that
for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푗 − 1},
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
푐푖 ⋅ 푠푗−1−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푗−푖
푐푗−1
⋅ 푐푗−1 ⋅ 푠.
Therefore, for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푗 − 1},
푥푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 푐푖 ⋅ 푠푗−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠푗+1−푖.
Now, go to step 푗 + 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3
The following examples prove that the axioms are independent.
Limits of Responsibility: The Upstream Equal Sharing rule, 훽, introduced by
Ni and Wang [12] satisﬁes NDR, CR and MIT. However, it does not satisfy LR
as we have shown in Example 2.
No Downstream Responsibility: Let 휔 be the following rule:
휔푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
⎧⎨⎩
푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠 if 푖 = 푗 < 푛,
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푠1−푠 if 푖 = 푗 = 푛,
푐푖−2 ⋅ 푠 if 푖 = 푗 + 1,
푐푖⋅푠
1−푠 if 푖+ 1 = 푗 = 푛,
0 otherwise,
where 푠 = 푡+푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
2 and 푐0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that this rule 휔 satisﬁes MIT, LR and CR. However, the
following example shows that it does not satisfy NDR. Let 푁 = {1, 2, 3}, 퐶 =
{10, 10, 10}, 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1 be a cost allocation problem. We have that
휔23(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
5
2 , while NDR states that 휔
2
3(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 0.
Consistent Responsibility: Let 휑 be the following rule:
휑푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푖 > 푗,
푐푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푠 if 푖 = 푗 < 푛,
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푠1−푠 if 푖 = 푗 = 푛,
푐푗−1⋅푠
푗−1 if 푖 < 푗 < 푛,
푐푗−1
푗−1 ⋅ 푠1−푠 if 푖 < 푗 = 푛,
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where 푠 = 푡+푡
∗
(푡,퐶)
2 and 푐0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that 휑 satisﬁes LR, NDR and MIT. However, the following
example shows that it does not satisfy CR. Let 푁 = {1, 2, 3}, 퐶 = {10, 10, 5},
푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1 be a cost allocation problem. We have that 휑22(⋅) = 253 ,
휑31(⋅) = 1, 휑32(⋅) = 1 and 휑21(⋅) = 53 . Then, 휑22(⋅) ⋅ 휑31(⋅) = 253 ∕= 53 = 휑21(⋅) ⋅ 휑32(⋅),
while CR would imply that 휑22(⋅) ⋅ 휑31(⋅) = 휑21(⋅) ⋅ 휑32(⋅).
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate: Let 휌 be the
following rule:
휌푗푖 (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if 푖 > 푗,
푐푖 ⋅ 푡푗−푖 − 푐푖−1 ⋅ 푡푗+1−푖 if 푖 ≤ 푗 < 푛,
푐푖 − 푐푖−1⋅푡1−푡 if 푖 = 푗 = 푛,
푐푖⋅푡푗−푖−푐푖−1⋅푡푗−푖+1
1−푡 if 푖 < 푗 = 푛,
where 푐0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that 휌 satisﬁes LR, NDR and CR. However, the following
example shows that it does not satisfy MIT. Let (푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) and (푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) be
two cost allocation problems, with 푁 = {1, 2}, 퐶 = {10, 20}, 푡 = 0, 푡 = 1 and
푢 = 푢 = 14 . We have that 휌
2
1(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡) = 0 and 휌
2
1(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) =
10
3 , although
MIT would imply that 휌21(푁,퐶, 푢, 푢) ≤ 휌21(푁,퐶, 푡, 푡).
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